Revolution had shown a stunned Europe that what had started as a minor jacquerie over the price of bread could have as consequence the imposition of the metric system on continental Europe.
Part I
We know that from early in his career, N ietzsche was concerned with the possibility of transforming the present by changing its past. Thus he can write in Use and
Misuse 0/History for Lift:
For since we are the outcome of earlier generations, we are also the outcome of their aberrations, passions and errors, and indeed of their crimes; it is not possible to free oneself wholly from this chain. If we condemn these aberrations, and regard ourselves free of them, this does not alter the fact that we originate in them. The best we can do is to confront our inherited and hereditary nature with our knowledge of it, and through a new, stern discipline combat our inborn heritage and implant in ourselves a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature, so that our first nature withers away. It is an attempt to give oneself, as it were aposteriori, a past in which one would like to originate in opposition to that in which one did originate: -always a dangerous attempt because it is so hard to know the limit to denial of the past and because second natures are usually weaker than first. What happens all too often is that we know the good but do not do it, because we also know the better but cannot do it. But here and there a victory is nonetheless achieved, and for the combatants, for those who employ critical history for the sake of life , there is even a noteworthy consolation: that of knowing that this first nature w~s once a second nature and the every victorious second nature will become a first. (On the Use and Misuse 01 History lor Lift, 3 
)2
Not only does this passage presage Zarathustra's wish to replace fatherlands and motherlands with his "chlldren's land," but we might even say that Nietzsche's entire life project is contained in this paragraph. The task is to implant in ourselves a "new habit, a new instinct, a second nature." If, Marx, Freud and Nietzsche argued, we are creatures of our past -whether as fetishes, totems, or idols -then it is only in changing the past that one creates a new present. If we are the children of our parents then it is only in changing parents, in engendering oneself that we become what we are. 3 The concept of changing the past is not as strange as it might seem. I am no longer what I was because of certain acts that 1 have undertaken, and while I was such and such aperson, because of those acts I am clearly no longer that person. 4 We are here to some degree in the realm of what ] .L.Austin called the "performative,,,5 that is, the realm of describing or naming something in such a manner that that actualizes what it iso To say "I promise" is actually to promise, not to refer to something. It is also to transform one's condition according to a set of expectations and obligations that you have the right to claim as your own and that others may acknowledge in you. To say "I do" in certain conditions is to move from being a person who was single, to being one who is married. The single person no longer exists. But how does such a transformation effectuate itself-how does one hold oneself as ones own future?
The problem N ietzsche thus sets for hirnself in the above citation is the production of conditions that make performance of a new present possible, i.e. overcome the hold that a particular past has on us. 6 
Part 11
One might think that such a transformation is a matter of will -as many of the standard interpretations ofNietzsche would lead one to believe. However, in Nietzsche's account of this transformation -of how one nature replaces a prior onewhat is precisely not central to hirn is will. N or does the idea of will play any role in the understanding of performatives. It is, however, tempting to think it might, for will is our faculty for shaping the future and corresponds temporally to memory, our faculty for shaping the past. 7 What is in fact the role of the will in these matters and why is it precisely not in play in the matter of the transformation of the past? Here, a consideration of what Nietzsche has to say about the will in the chapter "On Redemption" is apposite. The chapter opens with a scene that parodies Matthew's gospel. 8 Zarathustra is approached by a host of cripples and beggars who ask hirn to cure them of their illnesses. Zarathustra responds by saying that those who are crippled from some lack are not that badly off. Those who are truly badly off are those "inverse cripples" victims or products of the division of labor such that they have become a huge eye, or a huge leg with the rest of the body attached as a stalk. 9 We are launched with this strange introduction headlong into the problems of dealing with one's genealogy and one's past. Zarathustra has reaching the second, willing, metamorphosis of the spirit: he is, as he says, a cripple at the bridge, and also, as Heidegger notes, a Fürsprecher, still preparing the way for eternal return. The reason that he cannot be anything except a herald, that is, can only announce the new without realizing it, has to do with the structure of the will. Accordingly, he enters into a long discussion of the nature of the will.
The will is the faculty that humans have for shaping their future. It is the temporal inverse of memory. We recall here that the will is characteristic of the lion stage and that "the lion must become a child." In a note from the middle 1880's N ietzsche's attitude towards the will is made explicit: "The will itself to be overcome ... All feelings of freedom [are} no longer to be conceived in opposition to constraint" (KGW VII-I, 624; cf. VII-I, 198). The reason that the will needs to be overcome is that it will inevitably shape the future in terms of the structure of its own present. The will thus reproduces -and this is particularly vicious in the case of the will to power of slave morality.
New Nietzsche Studies
The realization that our will inevitably reproduces our life should actually not be a difficult understanding as it is lies precisely at the heart of a doctrine like original sin. Augustine's argument for the reality of original sin was the realization that human being would do evil "just for the hell of it," as it were, meaning that they did evil for no reason in particular and for no goal. If that were so, then there was nothing that could be done about it: sin was hardwired, so to speak, into the human self. From this it followed that the only way to be released from sin was to be released from one's sinful self -and that this could precisely not be achieved 'by willing to be released, as that will would retain the quality of sin. Original sin thus implied a necessity for redemption and this in turn was rested on an inability to move outside a repetitive temporal process. This chapter in Zarathustra is a chapter on redemption and redemption is first and foremost a religious manner of dealing with the past. To be redeemed means no longer to have one's past count in determining what one iso Thus Christ redeems the world through His crucifixion and washes away our sins: they may no longer count. What redemption implies is the possibility of a radical break with one's past: I cannot, however, redeem myself, as my willful and sinful nature makes that impossible. 10 Here I need to recall the citation from the second Untimely Consideration.
The best we can do is to confront our inherited and hereditary nature with our knowledge ofit, and through a new, stern discipline combat our inborn heritage and implant in ourselves a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature, so that our first nature withers away. It is an attempt to give oneself, as it were aposteriori, a past in which one would like to originate in opposition to that in which one did originate: -always a dangerous attempt because it is so hard to know the limit to denial of the past and because second natures are usually weaker than first. (UM 11, 3).
How is this to be done? This is the central problem the past poses for Nietzsche. As he says: "The past in us is to be overcome: instincts are to be newly combined -a very difficult matter" (WKG VII-, 545). The attempt to deal directly with the past -to annihilate it, or to escape from it through redemption -is dangerous or impossible, destruction rather than transformation. Nietzsche continues in On Redemption: "The will, the liberator, became one who harmed; and on all who can suffer he wreaks his revenge for his inability to go backwards. This, indeed this alone, is what revenge is: the will's ill will against time and its 'it was'."
The attempt to take revenge on the past presumes that there is something wrong with the past, some particular thing that should not have been what it was. And this in turn presumes that we can change our present by virtue of getting rid of that portion of the past that we find offensive. There are a variety of ways that one may try to deal with this problem and as the chapter continues we find that N ietzsche surveys each of them. One is the attempt to solve the problem of a "bad" past by locating value precisely in the phenomenon of change itself. Hegel had done this, accepting the claim that since history was eventually leading to a unity of actuality and potentiality, all of the past must be seen as good. Yet we know that for N ietzsche it is possible to be deeply and completely flawed -such was slave Strong / The Overcoming 0/the Past 201 morality. Secondly one might posit an unattainable world that was not subject to the problems of the paste For Kant, determining it to be the necessary apriori of the human mind solves the problem of time. Redemption is to be found in the world that is not subject to time.
Schopenhauer, who claimed that in the end all that could finally be really truly willed was nothingness, attempted a third solution. There is truth to this for Nietzsche, but he thinks it true only of slavely moral men. In effect, as he writes, Schopenhauer had deeply probed his own psyche and, unable to find any other alternative, has determined the end of the psyche in general. Yet, Nietzsche notes, one is not forced to say that the "world is Schopenhauer writ large" (WKG IV-2, 509). Schopenhauer's conception of the will remains "fatefully aporetic" as ]ean Granier has remarked, in that it is tied to the "old thing in itself." 11 For N ietzsche, the problem of humankind in relation to the past, is not to be found in willing something new, or in not willing, but by changing the form of life that wills. 12 N ietzsche is thus able to say that a "pure act" -one that leads neither consciously nor unconsciously to any unintended results -can only be an "unconscious one"; in fact, all "perfect acts are unconscious and no longer willed"(WKG VIII-3, 102). It was in Wagner that Nietzsche found the most important analysis of the relation of conscious to unconscious acts -accordingly the next snippet in "On Redemption" is about Wagner. For Wagner, at least by the time he gets to Parst/al, " the will at last redeems itself and becomes non-will." (One could here give an analysis of the stages by which Wagner reaches the conclusion as his thought develops from the Flying Dutchman, through Lohengrin, Die Meistersinger and the Ring tetralogy).
Yet N ietzsche hirnself took a while to extricate hirnself from the notion that the will was the answer to the problem of dealing with the paste The chapter continues with a reference (as I read it) to The Birth ofTragedy. "lIed you away from all these fables when I taught you the cwill is a creator'." Cit was' is a fragment, ariddIe, a dreadful accident -until the creative will says to it CBut thus I willed it ... But has the will already spoken thus? And when did that happen?" (Z, On Redemption).
At this point, Zarathustra breaks off and will remains silent for along time. Presumably the point is that previous attempts at dealing with the past are all deficient. These other conceptions of the will "do not exist at all" for "instead of grasping the formulation of a single wiling into many forms, [in them] one eliminates the character of willing by subtracting from the will its content, its "whither" (WKG VIII-3, 43). The point, presumably, is that there is nothing to the will except the particularities of its "whithers."
Part 111
If the world is nothing but will to power and will to power is nothing but its particular whithers (its na80t, as Nietzsche calls it) the world is thus made of out 202 New Nietzsehe Studies of "dynamic quanta: their essence lies in their relation to aB other quanta, in their 'working' on these"(WKG VIII-3, 51). Nietzsche here, in a late note, has picked up the notion of time he had advanced in his youth. In a section of a notebook from 1873, he writes: "time is not a continuum, for there are only totally differentiated time-points, no line." He refers to this as his "time-atom teaching" (WKG 111-4 177). 13 If time past is a set of quanta, whose unity is due only to the bringing of a particular perspective (i.e. the will to power) how then is it's relation to a particular present to be changed for, strictly speaking, it has no actual reality? Nietzsche avers that this means that one can no longer speak of time: "One is to speak only of points of time, no longer of time.,, 14 If one speaks only of points of time that means that all points are in a similar relationship to each individual. This means that each is present, or potentiaBy present, to each individual in the same manner, i.e. that they are not necessarily organized as a temporal sequence. Their organization must therefore correspond to the attitudes that the individual might have. Thus, as early as 1873, Nietzsche can write: "Time-atomics in the end falls in with a teaching of emotions or perception. The dynamic point of time is identical with the point of perception. For there is no simultaneity of attitude.,, 15 Even "A people with history is not redeemed from time/for history is a series/of timeless moments," wrote Eliot in Little Gidding. One can here, I think, understand what Nietzsche means by eternal return as an attempt to deal with the power oE time past and so to effectuate the replacement of a present problematic first nature by a new now second nature. Eternal return is, notoriously, the apparently most difficult, if not most problematic, element in Nietzsche's teaching. One can say, I think, the following. First, whatever N ietzsche means by eternal return, he does almost always associates it with change in human beings. The shepherd who bites the head of the snake in "On the Vision and the Riddle" is transfigured and laughs "like no man has ever laughed before." Once Zarathustra goes through his convalescence after this passage he is said to "be awake and ... stay awake eternally." Nietzsche warns that one "must guard against {thinking of eternal return on the example of} on the false analogy of the stars, or the ebb and flow, day and night, seasons .... "(KGW V-2, 400) and when "you incarnate the thought of thoughts it will change you." 16 Secondly, when the "thought of thoughts" comes it cannot mean that that there is no change. If I experience something as having experienced it before then I am having a new experience: the old one plus the new consciousness. Nietzsche speaks of eternal return as "the pivot point of history" and sees hirnself, notoriously, as "breaking history in two" (KGW VII-I, 540). In any case, "eternal" does not mean "infinite in time and duration" but "always present." Srrong / The Overcoming 0/the Past 203 If the chapter On Redemption establishes that humans cannot escape time and yet that time is for them a problem as it binds them to a form of life that is nihilistit, then they will have to find some way of being-in-time such that the past no longer poses a problem for the present. What would a form of life in which the past was never a problem -that is, it did not compel cyclical compulsive repetition (what Freud was to call the discontents or malaise of civilization) -and in which humans were, as opposed to animals, nevertheless self-conscious? The thought must "sink in slowly over many generations so that they will be fruitful and build on it (Two thousand years for Christianity -many thousand for this) ... "17
The above establishes, I hope, that eternal return is thought by Nietzsche to be a solution to the compulsions of the will, to the weight of a misbegotten past on the present, and that it is intended to transform human relation to a past that has become compulsive and nihilistic. It is, we might say, a means to change the structure of the unconscious. When in the last sentence of the Genealogy, Nietzsche notes that humans would rather "will the void than be void of will" he is indicating that the hold that the present past has on humans is such that they will continue to work within its structure, even when it no longer is sensuously alive.
Eternal return then occurs when an action embodies itself, that is, makes itself flesh in and by its performance. When you "incarnate the thought of thoughts, it will change you," was the citation above. Eternal return, however, is a mode of transformation or transfiguration, not the substance of it. In this sense, eternal return is in no ways the imposition of a particular substantive standard. Thus we find, set as a "task": "My teaching says live such that you must wish to so live again ... To whom striving gives the highest feeling, let hirn strive; to whom peace gives the highest feeling, let hirn be peaceful; to whom ordering, following, obedience give the highest feeling, let hirn obey. May he only become conscious about that which gives hirn the highest feeling, and not balk at any means. It is a matter of eternity." 18 
Part IV
I have claimed that the question of ete~nal return sheds light on the transfiguration of a present. 19 I have further claimed that this problem is centrally one of the hold that the past has on the present.. It is clear that Nietzsche saw extensive possibilities for this. "The coming history: this thought will always conquer more -and those who do not believe in it must eventually, due to their nature, die out.
Gnly he who holds his existence (Dasein) capable of eternal repetition will remain: amongst such beings however conditions such as no utopians have ever attained are possible.,,20 Such words tend to underplay the actual magic the humans have available to themselves. I spoke above of the quality of transfiguring one's past that language makes available to us by the availability of the performative. There is, however another element, or perhaps a few more elements to this. When Austin discusses the "infelicities" or "unhappinesses" ofperformatives, he apparently brings them down to the question of"non-responsibilities."21 By this he appears to mean the quality ofbeing able actually to mean what you say, to speak in such a manner that one's words are transparently one's own. This is the role that N ietzsche thinks may be reserved for the philosopherlegislator who can authentically use the words, "thus shall it be," where "authentically" means that they become actual. How might it work in Nietzsche's understanding? What is the process by which one can bind oneself in fact to one's words? To make one's words one's own is to be able actually to mean what one says. The question of making one's words one's own is the question that Nietzsche pursues in the second essay in the Genealogy o[ Morals, most especially in the first several sections on the "right to make promises" and the "sovereign individual."
The movement of the text in the first three sections is a first key. 22 In each of them Nietzsche describes the possibility of a particular kind of being-in-the-world (the right to make promises, the sovereign individual, the acquisition of conscience) and then circles back to give an account for the genealogy of that quality. Thus the right to make promises requires first the development of calculability, regularity, and necessity (GM 11: 1). The sovereign individual requires the development of a memory. And so forth. Each of these qualities is what Nietzsche calls his "late" or "ripest" fruit," the coming into being of which required ripening. N ietzsche is quite clear that these earlier developments are the means to making possible a "sovereign individual" (for instance). Nietzsche refers to this as "a preparatory task" and includes in it what he calls human "prehistory." What is key here is the understanding of history: the past has made possible the present, but it has not monotonically determined it. The resources for a variety of presents are in the past, if we can deconstruct the past we have received and reassemble it.
What quality does the sovereign individual -whom I take here to be an individual who has earned the right to say what s/he is -have? Nietzsche details a number of qualities in GM 11: 2, all of which sound like or are intended to sound like the megalopsuchos of Aristotle. 23 Yet there is a difference between Nietzsche's sovereign individual and the great soul in Aristotle, for the sovereign individual is the result of an achievement, a process by which a consciousness has become instinct. (Here there is of course an echo of the passage from "Use and Misuse of History"). What is important though for us here is the insistence that Nietzsche places on the "right to make promises."24 W e are returned with that consideration to the question of performatives -of which promising is the standard example. Yet what Nietzsche has done is to make the matter much deeper. When he asks as to the right to make a promise, it is as if the expectation is that I will be tempted to act weakly. But what would/could keep me from being weak of will if rationality is of no actual avail? N ietzsche says it requires that I have "mastery over circumstances, over nature, and over all more short-willed and unreliable creatures" (GM 11: 2). Those who have the right to promise are like "sovereigns," because they can maintain their promise in the face of accidents, even in the "face of fate." To have the right to a promise is to have taken upon oneself, as oneself, all the circumstances present and future in which the promise may occur. It is to maintain that promise -the requirement that the present extend into the future -no matter what befalls. Thus when Kaufmann translates the key passage -''für sich als Zukunft gut sagen zu können" as "able to stand security for his own future," one may pass by Nietzsche's point, which is that one should be able to "to be able to vouch for oneself as a future." One must earn entitlement to one's "own."
In this, and despite obvious echoes, Nietzsche's position is not Kant's. In the Grundwerk and elsewhere Kant argues that one cannot break a promise because to do so would in effect deny the point of the entire institution of promising. Kant took this position with its very strong denial of the relevance of intentionality because, as he argued, any breaking of a promise or uttering of a lie for contingent reasons (say, as with Sartre, you were being asked by the Gestapo where the partisan whom you were hiding was) implied that you could claim to know precisely what the consequences of your action would be. Since such a claim was epistemologically impossible, it followed that one must be bound by the only certainty one might have, that of reason.
Kant's reason for keeping a promise or not telling a lie impHed the existence of a fixed and unproblematic self and of an incompletely graspable world. The difference in Nietzsche's analysis of the right to keep promises comes in his insistence that not only is the external world not knowable but so also is the self. Hence the binding of the self to a promise can only be rightfully accomplished by power "over oneself and over fate" and must penetrate below the level of assessment -where it remained with Kant -to become part of the assessing itself, what Nietzsche calls "instinct," or das Unbewusste.
Nietzsche is also clear -here contra Kant, and post-Kantians from Rawls to Habermas -that the self that is so committed is committed also to all the pain and all the reversals that will and may occur -pains that can be seen in his exploration of what he calls mnemotechnics. In this, the sovereign individual in N ietzsche will find an instantiation in Weber's person who has the vocation for politics and who can remain true to his vocation, "in spite of all." (One might note here that the insistence on the pain and cruelty of existence was already central to the argument in the Birth ofTragedy). Pain and cruelty have been endemic to life.
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In a note from 1885 he writes: "Basic idea: new values must first be createdwe must not be spared that! The philosopher must be a lawgiver to uso New types. (As earHer the highest types [e.g., Greeks] were bred: this type of 'accident' to be willed consciously.)"26 EIsewhere Nietzsche writes that one will "have to change all 206 New Nietzsehe Studies ones ideas about politics." For it seems that we "lack all political passion" (KGW VIII-I, 86). For Nietzsche this seems to mean that whereas in the past humans competed inside an arena for advantage and superiority, for the re-division of what was. Now they will compete to define what might in fact give superiority and advantage. The breakdown ofa common world, which N ietzsche sees as characteristic of modernity,27 means that humans increasingly will have no idea of what really counts to be fought for. Hence the new idea of politics will be conflict and war to say what does count, what the standards by which humans measure themselves shall be. This is politics to define the world, not gain control of more of it. N ietzsche's conception of politics, I have argued, is shaped by the problematic of dealing with the weight of time-past. This is a politics that is revolutionary, revolutionary in a cultural sense, not in or by culture but of culture. It involves reforming what it means to be in the world, changing not just one's assessment of the world, but the very quality of one's assessing.
One can read Nietzsche's life project as an attempt to accomplish this. Initially he was quite clear about his intentions. In December 1871, the first copies of The Birth ofTragedy came off the press. His intentions, however, went already far beyond this first book. He had, as he wrote to Rohde, "cultural regeneration on his mind. ,,28 His friendship with Wagner had convinced hirn of the possibility of a collegial enterprise in recovering what he called in the Birth a "mythic" understanding of the world: his cultural criticism would prepare the public and intellectual stage and Wagner's music would engender the questioning or search for which a new c\llture would be the language. In order to initiate this cultural revolution, he elaborated extensive and enthusiastic plans. The Birth was but part of a first volley in a war for the reorientation of German culture, a war that he had already announced in the ] anuary letter to Rohde in which he had doubted of his suitability for the vocation of philologist (signing hirnself "The Mounted Gunner with the Heaviest Gun"). The next shot was also prepared. In the first three months of 1872 he gave set of lectures "On the Future of Our Educational Institutions" in order, he indicated to his teacher, the great German philologist Friedrich Ritschl, to "carry out the practical consequences of my views." N or were his horizons bordered by academia. The letter to Ritschl indicates also that he is preparing a memorandum to the German Chancellor Bismarck asking hirn to explain what an opportunity has been "shamefully" let go by when one might have established the institutions that might have provided a foundation to aregeneration of German culture. (The opportunity here was to found a proper university in Strasbourg, on territory newly acquired in the Franco-Prussian War). N ietzsche's appreciation of Bismarck during this period is in fact one of increasing disenchantment. In 1866 he had admired Bismarck's handling of the SchleswigHolstein crisis in order to found a unified Germany, but had worried to his mother and sister that Bismarck "undervalues the moral strengths in the people. ,,29 What is important is not only that he thought during this period that he might be able to have help in his project from the dominant political forces in Germany, but that he saw this as necessarily rooted in the populace at large. His doubts are intensified by the incomprehension afforded his first published book by the very people whom he had thought would grasp it. It requires from hirn that he pursue another direction: a resounding and radical critique of aB the institutions and forms that keep his contemporaries from acknowledging philosophy, tragedy and the possibility of a culture. In a note from 1886, written as he was preparing to write the "Attempt at a Self-Critique H The remedy of this lack becomes his project from the middle 1870's until the end of his life, and aB of his work from that period must be understood in these terms.
The work of Human-A//-Too-Human, Dawn, and the first four books of The Gay Science are aB investigations into his own blindness's and obscurities, what it was in hirn that led hirn to be surprised by the reception of the project that centered on the Birth. FoBowing that the work of the 1880's may be read as systematic investigations into various human realms. Zarathustra is (among other things, to be sure) an exploration of various human institutions. Beyond Good and Evi/ is a study of how it is possible to make a claim to knowledge in various areas. The Genea/ogy 0/Morals is a study of what it in fact means when one claims a moral stance. In a like manner, Twilight is a study of the nature of claims to authority and Ecce Homo a critique of what it means to make a claim, that is to write at aB as an author. 30 By 1888, Nietzsche had accomplished his critique. He is aware of coming to its end and begins to prepare the work of the new tablets. In a phrase he repeats several times, eternal return is to function as a kind of hammer, that is at once to 31 What is telling is that as he moves out of his sane life, his thoughts and prescriptions are now explicitly and specifically political. To break out of the prison of our present being is both difficult and dangerous. Nietzsche will thus speak often of the attractions that his doctrines have for humans and will be afraid that they will seize on these attractions as justification for behavior to which they are not entitled. He writes: "You must have lived through every degree ofskepticism and have bathed with delight in ice-cold streams -otherwise you have no right to this thought. I must defend myself against the easy-to-believe and the enthusiasts. ,, 32 Success here requires that these thoughts and this discipline become a "great tree, which overshadows all of coming humanity." The advantage of the discipline he proposes, he notes, is that it will be "gentle against those who do not believe in it, it has no hell and no threat. Who does not believe lives cursorily in his own understanding. ,, 33 Conditions must be created such that the doctrine can "sink in slowly" (KGW V-2, 401) failing which there will be "thirty years Gloria, with drums and fifes and thirty years ofgrave-digging and then an eternity of deathly silence.... 34 At the end ofhis life, with one foot into madness, Nietzsche undertakes to write aseries of political letters -to various friends, to the Kaiser, Bismarck and so forth. 35 He hopes also that war will not be necessary as "there are still other ways to bring physiology to honor besides military hospitals ... WeIl and good, very good in fact: after the old God is abolished, I am ready to rule the world"(KGW VIII-3 420). If in annihilating the Hohenzollern, Nietzsche claimed to be annihilating lies; it is because changing ideas is not in the end possible without changing lives. W ittgenstein wrote that the sickness of a time is cured not by a medicine but by an alteration in the mode of life of human beings. 36 Response to the problem of the weight of time past on what we are is only achieved through such an alteration. It was to make possible that alteration that Nietzsche wrote and thought.
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